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BABY KA-BOOM! COMING
DEVELOPMENTS IN ERISA LITIGATION
DUE TO SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND
FINANCIAL PRESSURES FROM THE BABY
BOOM GENERATION
CRAIG C. MARTIN,* MATTHEW J. RENAUD,** AND
DOUGLAS A. SONDGEROTH***
INTRODUCTION

Legal developments never take place in a vacuum. Rather,
they are the natural response to the developments in our daily
lives. It generally is only a matter of time before the headlines
and trends reported in the newspapers are reflected in plaintiffs'
complaints and judges' opinions. Because of this relationship,
recognizing current changes today can be an important way to
predict future areas of litigation. Few legal areas more clearly
reflect the relationship between social trends and the newest
forms of litigation than employee benefits. Over recent decades,
employee benefits litigation under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"), has developed
in response to several trends that have been at work in the
Employees and employers are
nation's offices and factories.
confronted with social, demographic, and financial pressures that
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Martin is a member of the Firm's Policy Committee, Co-Chair of its Litigation
Committee, the Chair of its ERISA Litigation Practice, and the Co-Chair of its
Business Litigation Practice. Mr. Martin regularly represents and advises
clients with respect to fiduciary and ERISA issues. Mr. Martin received his
B.A. from the University of Notre Dame in 1985, and his J.D. from Harvard
Law School in 1988.
** Matthew J. Renaud is a partner in Jenner & Block LLP's Chicago office.
Mr. Renaud is Co-Chair of the Firm's Employee Benefits and Executive
Compensation Practice and a member of its ERISA Litigation Practice and
Private Equity/Investment Management Practice. Mr. Renaud earned his
B.S.E. (Electrical Engineering) from the University of Michigan in 1989 and
his J.D. from the University of Michigan in 1992.
*** Douglas A. Sondgeroth is an associate in Jenner & Block LLP's
Chicago office. He is a member of the Firm's Litigation Department and its
ERISA Litigation Practice. Mr. Sondgeroth earned his B.A. from Augustana
College in Rock Island, Illinois, in 1999 and his J.D. from Boston College Law
School in 2002. The authors wish to thank Jenner & Block associate Marek
Badyna for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
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have lead to several types of ERISA litigation. This Article
explores the impact that social, demographic, and financial trends
have had on the development of ERISA litigation, and it examines
how that process is continuing today. In particular, it considers
the latest pressures employers and employees face related to the
impending large-scale retirement of America's Baby Boomers.
This Article provides an analysis of these emerging trends and
discusses new forms of litigation that are likely to develop in
response to them. Part I of this Article discusses some of the
major pressures that have affected America's workplaces over
recent decades. Part II summarizes specific forms of ERISA
litigation that arose in response since the 1980s to today. Part III
discusses the current pressures presented by the impending
retirement of the Baby Boomers. Finally, Part IV identifies new
forms of ERISA litigation that are now developing in response to
these latest forces.
I.

RECENT SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES
THAT HAVE TRANSFORMED EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

Since ERISA was passed in 1974, the world of employee
benefits has been transformed dramatically. This transformation
is largely a result of a series of pressures that have affected the
types of benefits employers offer, the forms of compensation that
employees desire, and the overall economics of employee benefits.
A. Social Pressures
A key social change since 1974 has been the transformation of
the American work place from one more heavily focused on
manufacturing to one that is more services-oriented. Since the
1960s, the share of the nation's gross domestic product
attributable to services has more than doubled, and most of the
increase occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. 1 Since 1977 and the end
of the 1990s, the average annual real output growth in services
was been 7.1% while manufacturing's growth rate was been only
2.7%.2
The manufacturing sector, which had long provided
substantial benefits to its employees and even its retirees, was
particularly impacted by this change in the make-up of the

1. Kenneth McLennan, Worker Representation And Participation in
Business Decisions Through Employee Involvement Programs, 3 U. PA. J.
LABOR & EMP. L. 563, 570 (2001) (reporting that the contribution of services
share increased from 9.5 percent in 1959 to 20.4 percent in 1997); see also
Daniel Meckstroth, MANUFACTURERS ALLIANcE/MAPI, EMPLOYMENT AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998-2008 1, 3 (1999)
(reporting largest job growth in 1988 to 1998 was in service sector and that
manufacturing accounted for only 13 percent of jobs by 1998).
2. McLennan, supra note 1, at 570.
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economy. 3 By 2002, manufacturing accounted for only 13.9% of
4
the nation's GDP.
In addition, the changing make-up of the American economy
came at the same time as two other important trends: increased
incidence of permanent workforce reductions, i.e. downsizing, and
increased employee turnover.
First, as employers adjusted to the changing make-up of the
American economy, significant downsizing occurred in the late
1980s and early 1990s. 5 During that time, many employers were
forced to shed large numbers of their workforces. 6 While there
were instances of layoffs and plant closures, many employers also
offered incentive packages or early retirement programs that gave
7
older employees the option to choose to leave voluntarily.
Second, in response to both the changed economy and
downsizing, there has been an increase in turnover among
employees. When ERISA was promulgated in the 1970s, workers
often stayed at the same employer for decades, but by the 1990s
employee turnover was much higher. In 2000, most workers
surveyed said that they did not plan to remain with their employer
long-term. 8
Together, the trends of increased downsizing and increased
employee turnover have resulted in another social pressure: the
increased mobility of workers. While employees used to spend
their entire careers with one employer, today's workers are much
more likely to change employers or professions multiple times.
Statistics reflect that in 1992, eight percent of permanent workers
changed employers. 9 By 1994, the number rose to eleven percent
and, in 1999, it was fourteen percent. 10 A typical worker will hold

3. See Meckstroth, supra note 1, at 3 (reporting negative job growth in
mining, manufacturing, and utility sectors during 1988-1998).
4. See Josh Bivens, Robert Scott & Christian Wellen, MENDING
MANUFACTURING: REVERSING POOR POLICY DECISIONS IS THE ONLY WAY TO

END CURRENT CRISIS 1 (2003), available at http://epinet.org/briefingpapers/
144/bp144.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Sanford M. Jacoby, Melting into Air? Downsizing, Job
Stability, and the Future of Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1195, 1202-03 (2000)
(discussing the movement of jobs away from heavy industry and the growing
importance of educated workers).
6. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, 2 Large Companies Make Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 1993, at D1 (reporting 2.2 million permanent layoffs between 1986 and
1993).
7. See id. (reporting early retirement offer made to 25,000 employees).
8. Dave Murphy, Take a Bite Out of Your Job Turnover, S.F. EXAMINER,
Apr. 16, 2000, at J1 (reporting only twenty-five percent of those surveyed
considered themselves committed and planning to stay for two more years); see
also Jacoby, supra note 5, at 1204.
9. Edwin R. Render, How Would Today's Employees Fare in a Recession?,
4 U. PA. J. LABOR & EMP. L. 37, 49 n. 55 (2001).
10. Id.
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nearly nine jobs between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four.1
The combination of social pressures like the changing
American economy and increased mobility has had a significant
impact on the benefits that employers offered to employees. The
most profound of these has been the change from defined benefit
plans to defined contribution plans.
Defined benefit plans are retirement plans that provide a
specific benefit at retirement for each eligible employee.1 2
Employers fund defined benefit plans on an actuarial basis, which
is designed to ensure that the plan will have adequate funds to
pay promised benefits to plan participants when they retire. To
determine participants' benefits, the pension plan establishes a
formula that often considers years of services and compensation.
The benefits provided under defined benefit plans for salaried
employees often are based on compensation earned near the end of
that person's career.
Thus, such plans reward long-term
employment. Also, because a defined benefit plan "consists of a
general pool of assets rather than individual dedicated accounts,
the employer typically bears the entire investment risk and must
cover any underfunding that may occur from the plan's
investments. 13
In contrast, defined contribution plans establish "an
individual account for each participant and for benefits based
solely upon the amount contributed to the . . . account." 14
Employees make voluntary contributions to the account, which
may be supplemented by periodic employer contributions. The
participant's retirement benefit is determined by the account
balance, which depends on the contributions plus net investment
earnings on the contributions. 15 While they bear an investment
risk because the benefit is not a fixed amount, the employees may
enjoy higher returns based on the market and their own
investment decisions. Because benefits in defined contribution
plans are based on contributions and investment earnings over an
entire career and not just the last year or last few years of
employment, defined contribution plans are generally more
portable if the employee leaves the employer and provide the
6
employee greater flexibility.1
11. Katherine E. Ulrich, You Can't Take It With You: An Examination of
Employee Benefit Portability and Its Relationship to Job Lock and the New
PsychologicalContract, 19 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMP. L.J. 173, 175 (2001).
12. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (citing
Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 154 (1993)); see also
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, and Assocs. Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1022 n.1 (2008).
13. See, e.g., Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 816 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(quoting Hughes Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 439).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006).
15. LaRue, 128 S.Ct. at 1022 n.1.
16. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 817 (contrasting a defined benefit and
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The social changes to the American workplace have
contributed to both a sharp decline in participation in defined
benefit plans and a corresponding increase in participation in
Between 1979 and 2005, the
defined contribution plans. 17
percentage of workers participating in only defined benefit plans
decreased from sixty-two percent to around ten percent.18 In that
same period, the percentage of participants in defined contribution
plans grew from sixteen percent to over sixty percent.1 9 This
change naturally follows the increased mobility of today's
As mobility and turnover have increased and
workforce.
workplace longevity has decreased, defined contribution plans
better meet the needs of the workplace and participants. Because
assets in defined contribution plans can be transported to a new
employer when a participant leaves, they are more portable and
better suited to today's workers.
In addition, the shift from defined benefit plans to defined
contribution plans has itself reflected another important social
change. Specifically, it reflects a movement toward private wealth
Because an increasing number of workers
management.
participate in defined contribution plans, they are more likely to
be responsible for their own investment decisions. This reflects
that today's workers and tomorrow's retirees are literally going to
be more personally invested in their retirements and less able to
rely on income provided by their employers.
B. DemographicPressures
One of the most significant demographic pressures many
employers have faced has resulted from the Baby Boom. The Baby
Boom generation is defined as those born in the post-World War II
period of 1946 to 1964.20 When ERISA was passed in 1974, the
age of the first wave of Baby Boomers was twenty-eight. As Baby
Boomers finished school, employers had to incorporate them into
the workforce.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Baby Boomers continued to
rise through the ranks of the workforce. By 1980, the roughly
seventy-nine million Americans in the Baby Boom generation

defined contribution pension plan).
17. See Craig C. Martin & Amanda S. Amert, Cash Balance Plans
Reassessed in Light of Discriminationand Funding Litigation, 59 BUS. LAW.
453, 454 (2004); Ulrich, supra note 11, at 193.
18. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, U.S. RETIREMENT TRENDS
OVER THE PAST QUARTER-CENTURY at 1 (June 21, 2007), available at
http://www.ebri.org/ pdflpublications/facts/O607fact.pdf.

19. Id.
20. Craig C. Martin & Joshua Rafsky, The Pension ProtectionAct of 2006:
An Overview of Sweeping Changes in the Law Governing Retirement Plans, 40
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 843, 844 (2007).
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accounted for fifty-eight percent of Americans between the ages of
eighteen and sixty-five. 21 Employers, who were already facing the
social pressures discussed in Part I, found that they needed to also
make room for this large number of employees. The benefit
incentives some employers offered older employees to leave the
companies allowed employers to make room for younger workers
in the Baby Boom generation. 22 In the 1990s, studies reflected an
overall drop in the average retirement age as additional older
23
workers left the workforce.
C. FinancialPressures
A chief financial pressure employers have faced in recent
decades has been the dramatic increase in the cost of employee
benefits. In the 1960s, for example, employer-provided health
insurance accounted for only 2.7% of the typical private employer's
total employee compensation costs. 24 Since the 1980s, however,
employers' costs related to employee benefits have skyrocketed.
The annual increase of health care costs for private employers in
25
1980s and 1990s in some years was estimated at twenty percent.
By 1995, benefit costs accounted for twenty-eight percent of
26
employees' total compensation.
Today, health care and retirement costs continue to make up
a substantial portion of employers' overall costs, especially in older
industries where employers continue to provide benefits under
defined benefit plans. 27 These established companies are still
subject to high employee and benefit costs because those costs are
deeply entrenched in the companies' cost structures.
At the same time that employers faced increased financial
costs due to higher benefit costs, they also faced increased foreign
competition due to globalization.
While employers in older,
traditional industries remained and continue to be saddled with

21. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE 12 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/

07statab/pop.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Lohr, supranote 6.
23. See Gina Kolata, Family Aid to Elderly is Very Strong, Study Shows,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at A16 (reporting only 17 percent of men 65 and
older continued to work while in 1950 the percentage was 46 percent).
24.

See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, CENSUS BUREAU

241-42 (1966), available at http://www.census.govprod2/statcomp/documents/
1965-03.pdf. At that time, the maximum benefit paid out under nearly 75
percent of collective bargaining contracts was less than $2,000; see BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 44:6 (5th ed. 1961).

25. See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Employer Health Care Costs Rising At 21
Percent Rate, Report Says, DAILY LABOR REP., Jan. 14, 1991, at A3 (citing
increase in costs between 1987 and 1989).
26. Ulrich, supra note 11, at 181-82.
27. See, e.g., Josh Bivens, et al., supranote 4, at 1.
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high benefit costs, newer domestic manufacturers and
international competitors have not had to contend with these same
cost structures. Pension funding and other benefit costs at these
older companies has contributed to the disparate cost structures
between older companies in traditional industries like
manufacturing and newer domestic and international companies,
particularly when the workforce of these newer and foreign
companies is primarily non-unionized.
These financial pressures also contributed to the shift from
defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans discussed
above. Because they are primarily funded by the employer and
employers bear the investment risk, defined benefit plans are
riskier for employers to maintain than defined contribution
plans. 28 Accordingly, employers moved away from traditional
defined benefit plans because such plans are costly and place them
at a financial disadvantage against competitors who offer less
costly 401(k) and other defined contribution programs. In recent
years, several large and well-known companies including Verizon,
IBM, Lockheed Martin, Alcoa, Sears, Hewlett Packard, and Delta
Airlines have sought to freeze or cut their future defined benefit
29
accruals.
II. RECENT ERISA LITIGATION RESULTING
FROM THESE PRESSURES
The combination of the social, demographic, and financial
pressures outlined in Part I led to a variety of recent forms of
ERISA litigation. As employers adjusted to these pressures by
modifying the benefits they offered, many participants-with help
from the plaintiffs' bar-took action to secure the benefits they
believe they were owed.
A. Material MisrepresentationLitigation in the Late 1980s-1990s
Facing social pressures due to the changing face of the
American economy and increased financial pressures due to costs
and competition, many employers in the late 1980s and 1990s
Employers faced demographic
downsized their workforces.30
pressures as well because, around that time, the first wave of Baby
Boomers was entering or on the verge of entering their 40s. In
reducing their payrolls by downsizing and in accommodating the
28. Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives
and other Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 477-78
(2004).
29. See 152 Cong. Rec. S38 (2006), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/record.xpd?id=109-h20060308-38&person=400267 (statement of Rep.
George Miller [D-CA]) (discussing various retirement and pension issues).
30. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (describing the downward

shift in labor in response to financial constraints).
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large number of Baby Boomers who were coming up in the ranks,
many employers offered enhanced retirement packages to
employees to give employees an incentive to leave the company.
While these enhanced offers provided benefits to many workers,
employers soon found themselves in litigation.
Generally,
participants who took the offers alleged that shortly after they
accepted the employer's offer, the employer modified the plans to
provide better benefits, and that the participants were entitled to
those enhanced benefits. 31 Plaintiffs alleged that they acted in
reliance on alleged misrepresentations by employer and made
benefit
and
employment
decisions
based
on
these
32
misrepresentations.
Under ERISA, fiduciaries must discharge their duties "solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." 33 For
example, they have the duty to not mislead plan participants
regarding material information about participants' benefits.3 4
Participants may bring claims for breaches of fiduciary duty if a
fiduciary breaches its duty by making misrepresentations to the
employees. 35 To prevail, the plaintiff must show that the fiduciary
breached its fiduciary duties by misleading plan participants or
misrepresenting the terms or administration of a plan. 36
For example, in Varity Corp. v. Howe, an employer
represented to its employees that an impending corporate
restructuring would not adversely affect their benefits. 37 Plaintiffs
claimed that the corporation knew this was false. 38 The Supreme
Court found that while the misrepresentations related to the
financial health of the company, the employer was acting in its
fiduciary capacity, not as an employer making business
decisions.3 9 The Supreme Court held that the employer breached
its fiduciary duty by intentionally misleading employees about the
new subsidiary's chances for financial success and security of
benefits to persuade the employees to transfer to the subsidiary. 40
The Court reasoned that the employer's goal in its
misrepresentations was to terminate the employees' benefits and

31. See, e.g., Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 699 (1st Cir. 1994);
Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 1993); Berlin v. Mich.
Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1158 (6th Cir. 1988).
32. See, e.g., Danis v. Cultor Food Sci., Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 247, 258-59 (D.
Conn. 2001).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
34. See, e.g., Kalda v. Sioux Valley Physician Partners, Inc., 481 F.3d 639,
644 (8th Cir. 2007).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006).
36. See, e.g., Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 640 (7th Cir. 2004).
37. 516 U.S. 489, 498 (1996).
38. Id. at 494, 505.
39. Id. at 505.
40. Id. at 506-07.
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reduce its costs.41

Varity implicitly affirmed a pre-existing line of cases which
required employers to reveal information to plan participants
when they were seriously considering plan changes. 42 Subsequent
to Varity, most circuit courts have found a fiduciary must provide
information that it knows or should know would be harmful to
withhold based on the fiduciary's knowledge of the specific
participant's situation because that information is likely to be
material to the participant. 43 Accordingly, federal courts often
hold that a fiduciary has a duty to inform beneficiaries of possible
changes to a plan or a new plan when such changes are under
"serious consideration." These courts have held that a duty of
accurate disclosure begins "when (1) a specific proposal (2) is being
discussed for purposes of implementation (3) by senior
44
management with the authority to implement the change."
Other courts, however, decided that courts should look to a
number of factors to determine whether a statement about a
future plan provision is material. 45 These factors include:
(1) "how significantly the statement misrepresents the present
status of internal deliberations regarding future plan changes," (2)
"the special relationship of trust and confidence between the plan
fiduciary and beneficiary," (3) "whether the employee was aware of
other information or statements from the. company tending to
minimize the importance of the misrepresentation or should have
been so aware, taking into consideration the broad trust
responsibilities owed by the plan administrator to the employee and

41. Id. at 506.
42. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F. 3d 399, 404 (8th
Cir. 1995); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Berlin, 858 F. 2d at 1164.
43. See, e.g., Gregg v. Transp. Workers of Am. Int'l, 343 F.3d 833, 847-48
(6th Cir. 2003); Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 46162 (3d Cir. 2003); Griggs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 380
(4th Cir. 2001); Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 590-91 (7th
Cir. 2000); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997).
44. See, e.g., Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996);
see also Winkel v. Kennecott Holdings Corp., 3 Fed. Appx. 697, 703 (10th Cir.
2001); Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 220 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting
serious consideration test but stating factors should not be applied too rigidly);
McAuley v. IBM Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1043 (6th Cir. 1999) (adopting serious
consideration test); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 270 n.6 (1st Cir.
1997) (plaintiff "must show that a specific proposal under serious
consideration would have affected him")(emphasis added); but see Beach v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 382 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting
majority rule but leaving Seventh Circuit standard undecided); Mathews v.
Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1180-182 (9th Cir. 2004) (duty not to actively
misinform applies even before serious consideration begins).
45. See, e.g., Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir.
1997); see also Martinez v. Schlumberger Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 428 (5th Cir.
2003).
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the employee's reliance on the plan administrator for truthful
information," and (4) "the specificity of the assurance. 46
These courts, however, state that while an "employer has no
affirmative duty to disclose the status of its internal deliberations
on future plan changes even if it is seriously considering such
changes

. . .

if it chooses

. . .

to speak it must do so truthfully

"47

Because
of cases
like
Varity and the material
misrepresentation cases, employers must be careful in how
information is conveyed when they offer benefits to their
employees. As enhanced benefits were being offered to encourage
workers to leave, many employers were caught in this "trap for the
unwary.
B. Retiree Medical Benefits Litigation in the 1990s
to the Early 2000s
At the same time that employers were facing tough times and
attempted to reduce their benefit cost by restructuring their work
forces, some employers also were squeezed by increased benefit
costs, particularly retiree medical benefits. 4s
In response,
employers either increased the premiums that recipients had to
pay for the benefits, reduced the benefits they provided, or
eliminated them altogether. 49 Throughout the 1990s and the turn
of the century, participants and retirees brought litigation to
restore their benefits or reduce their increased premiums.
ERISA generally does not regulate the substantive content of
welfare benefit plans and it specifically excludes welfare benefits
such as medical benefits from the minimum participation, vesting
and minimum funding requirements applicable to pension
benefits. 50 Therefore, unless a plan sponsor contractually cedes its
46. Ballone, 109 F.3d at 125; see also Martinez, 338 F.3d at 428 (courts

must ask "whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person
in the plaintiffs' position would have considered the information an employeradministrator allegedly misrepresented important in making a decision to
retire.").
47. Martinez, 338 F.3d at 430.
48. In addition, rules related to how many employers accounted for these
benefits and their costs changed in the early 1990s. Since 1993, publiclytraded employers have been required under Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard No. 106 ("FAS 106") to recognize as a current expense
the cost of these anticipated benefits. E.g., Larry Grudzien, The Great
Vanishing Benefit, Employer Provided Retiree Medical Benefits: The Problem
and Possible Solutions, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 785, 786 (2006). After FAS
106, there was a substantial decline in the percentage of employers providing
retiree medical benefits. Id. at 787.
49. See, e.g., UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 1999);
UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983).
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1053(a), 1081(a)(1) (2006); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). Courts have noted that "[t]o require
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freedom to unilaterally modify the plan, it is generally free under
ERISA to adapt, modify, or terminate welfare benefits at any time
for any reason.5 1 However, if a plan sponsor promised vested
benefits, that promise can be enforced.5 2 Therefore, courts have
held that the plan sponsor and employee may contract to maintain
welfare benefits at a certain level that ERISA does not mandate. 53
To determine whether participants' obtained vested rights,
courts typically interpreted the agreement at issue and applied
principles of contract interpretation. Most courts concluded that,
like other forms of welfare benefits, retiree medical benefits only
vested if and when a contract specifies, not upon the attainment of
a certain status, such as retirement or disability. 54 As the
Supreme Court has stated, "ERISA does not create any
substantive entitlement to employer-provided health benefits or
any other kind of welfare benefits."5 5 The Sixth Circuit, which
covers states like Michigan and Ohio that were hit hard by the
social and financial changes in the 1980s and 1990s, was one of
the few courts to suggest that when considering benefits provided
under a collective bargaining agreement:
retiree benefits are in a sense 'status' benefits which, as such, carry
with them an inference that they continue so long as the
prerequisite status is maintained. Thus, when the parties contract
for benefits which accrue upon achievement of retiree status, there
is an inference that the parties likely intended those benefits to
56
continue as long as the beneficiary remains a retiree.

the vesting of these ancillary benefits would seriously complicate the
administration and increase the cost of plans whose primary function is to
provide retirement income." Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 491
(2d Cir. 1988).
51. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 78; Hackett v. Xerox Corp. Long

Term Disability Benefits Plan, 315 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2003).
52. Am. Fed'n of Grain Millers v. Int'l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 980
(2d Cir. 1997); Wheeler v. Dynamic Eng'g, Inc., 62 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir.
1995). Vested for the purposes of ERISA means "nonforfeitable," which is
further defined as "unconditional." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(19), 1002(25).
53. Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.
1996); Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 937 (5th Cir. 1993).
54. See, e.g., Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1154,
1160 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that benefit rights did not vest on the occurrence
of the disability but vested only when the contract so provided); Chiles v.
Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that because
plan's language did not clearly indicate disability triggered vesting, plaintiffs
receipt of disability insurance did not entitle employee to vested right);
Williams v. Caterpillar, Inc., 944 F.2d 658, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Retiree
medical benefits do not become vested once an employee becomes eligible or
retires."); Moore, 856 F.2d at 491 ("[a]utomatic vesting does not occur in the
case of welfare plans").
55. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 78.

56. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1482. However, in later opinions, the Sixth
Circuit was clear that it was not creating a presumption that such benefits
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While courts often recognized that employees could obtain
vested medical benefits, much of the retiree medical benefit
litigation focused on what language was necessary for welfare
benefits to vest. Generally, courts found that the level of formality
57
needed to vest benefits needed to match the formality of the plan.
In addition, courts decided that if the agreement is ambiguous as
to when and if the welfare benefits vest, extrinsic evidence could
58
be used to show that the benefits were meant to be vested.
However, courts were frequently reluctant to provide plaintiffs
with vested benefits absent "clear and express language" to that
59
effect.
The retiree medical benefits litigation cases clearly reflect the
impact that the financial pressures had on employers and
participants, but also a social change where it could no longer be
assumed that retirees could rely on their former employers to
provide medical coverage in the future. The employers faced
significant increases in costs for benefits that they argued they
never agreed to provide forever and without change. Participants
responded that they had anticipated that these benefits would be
available, and employers were taking them away after
participants had provided their services to those employers.
Ultimately, the courts were required to step in and resolve the
difficult question of what the parties intended years after the
agreements were drafted. In the end, however, many retirees
could not present the level of proof that courts required to
establish that the benefits were to be vested.
C. Cash Balance Litigation from the 1980s to the Pension
ProtectionAct of 2006
As discussed above, the traditional defined benefit plan
became increasingly ill-suited to today's workplace. In response,
some employers shifted to a hybrid of defined benefit and defined
contribution plans called the cash balance plan. Cash balance
plans were one of employers' first attempts at controlling their
defined benefit liabilities.
While cash balance plans have generally been governed by

vested and that courts must still interpret the terms of the applicable contract.
See, e.g., Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 917 (6th Cir. 2000); In re
White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that plan
provider and intended beneficiary may contract for vested retiree welfare
benefits, but retiree welfare benefits are not required to vest at retirement).
57. See, e.g., Schonholz, 87 F.3d at 78.
58. Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1993).
59. Wise, 986 F.2d at 937; see also Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 141-42;
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 961 F.2d 1384,
1386 (8th Cir. 1992).
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the ERISA rules that govern traditional defined benefit plans, 60
they are intended to look like defined contribution plans because
workers are provided with hypothetical individual accounts. 61 In
cash balance plans, a participant's hypothetical account receives a
semi-annual or annual credit comprised of a percentage of the
participant's compensation and an interest credit that is set by the
plan. 62 The employees' personal accounts are not separately
funded by the employer, however.63 By legal definition, a cash
balance pension plan is a defined benefit plan because the
individual accounts cash balance plans establish are merely
fictional and do not actually exist. 64 From an economic standpoint,
however, a cash balance pension plan resembles a hybrid
arrangement where a defined benefit plan functions as a defined
65
contribution plan.
Because cash balance plans provide that an individual's
account will receive interest credits that are outside the control of
the employer, the employer bears the risk that the plan's
investment return may fall below the interest credit rate
guaranteed by the plan. 66 However, the employer benefits if the
plan's net investment return is above the rate guaranteed by the
plan. 67
Because the employer bears the risk with these
investments, cash balance plans, like defined benefit plans, have
been subject to a number of statutory requirements that do not
apply to defined contribution plans.
Despite these statutory
requirements, cash balance plans are attractive to employers
because they typically are less costly to maintain than traditional
defined benefit plans and there tends to be less volatility in the
employer's funding obligations. 6s Younger workers also typically
prefer the cash balance plans because they provide a more even
benefit to workers regardless of the time spent working for their
69
employer.
Because until recently most of the ERISA provisions that
govern cash balance plans predated those plans, 70 litigation
60. Martin & Amert, supra note 17, at 455 (citing EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, New EBRI Backgrounder Cash Balance Pros and Cons
Outlined, PR NEWSWIRE, June 24, 1999, available at LEXIS, U.S. News
Library).
61. Id.
62. Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636, 637 (7th Cir. 2006).
63. Id.
64. See Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2000).
65. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Martin & Amert, supra note 17, at 458; CCH, LEGISLATION 2006,
PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 334
(2006).
69. Martin & Amert, supra note 17, at 455-56.
70. West v. AK Steel, 484 F.3d 395, 410 (6th Cir. 2007); Esden, 229 F.3d at
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resulted as employers and employees tried to apply ERISA's
provisions for defined benefit plans to cash balance plans. 7 1 While
there have been several vexing issues related to cash balance
plans, two stood out as being particularly common in litigation.
The first was litigation related to the so-called "whipsaw effect."
The whipsaw effect is a complicated issue, but, in essence, it
arises from the fact that ERISA and Internal Revenue Service
rules governing distributions from defined benefit plans mainly
contemplate the "normal retirement benefit"-typically, a singlelife annuity payable at normal retirement age. 72 Any optional
distribution, such as a lump sum payment, must be no less than
the "actuarial equivalent" of the normal retirement benefit. 73 To
make this calculation for a cash balance plan, the employer must
project the participant's current cash balance forward to the
normal retirement age and then discount that balance back to
present value. 74 The rate used to project the balance may be
defined by the plan, but the discount rate has been prescribed
under the Internal Revenue Code. 75 If the plan's projection rate is
higher than the statutory discount rate, the present value of the
participant's benefit will exceed the participant's account
balance. 76 The IRS has taken the view that if the employer did not
pay out the higher figure, an impermissible forfeiture occurred in
77
violation of ERISA § 203(a) and I.R.C. § 411(a)(2).
Accordingly, employers who did not pay the higher amount
found themselves in litigation brought by participants who alleged
they were owed additional benefits. Since 2000, four circuits have
considered the whipsaw issue, and each concluded that the
employers had failed to pay the benefits that ERISA and the
Treasury regulations required. 78 Relying on the statutory text and

159 (noting that defined benefit rules "do not always fit in a clear fashion with
cash balance plans").
71. See, e.g., Gary I. Boren and Norman P. Stein, QUALIFIED DEFERRED
COMPENSATION PLANS, §1.8 (2007); see also Esden, 229 F.3d at 159; Eaton,
117 F. Supp. 2d at 817-18.
72. Esden, 229 F.3d at 159.
73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id. The "applicable interest statutory rate" was the interest rate on 30year treasury obligations and found at I.R.C. § 417(e) (2006); Boren & Stein,
supra note 71, § 1.8.
76. Esden, 229 F.3d at 159. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, the dispute only
arises if the projection rate and the discount rate are different. Lyons v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. Salaried Employees Ret. Plan, 221 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th
Cir. 2000). "If the plan had pegged the interest [projection] rate to the
prescribed maximum discount rate, there would have been no difference . ..
and no dispute." Id.
77. Esden, 229 F.3d at 159.
78. West, 484 F.3d at 410; Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guar. Plan,
338 F.3d 755, 763 (7th Cir. 2003); Esden, 229 F.3d at 159; Lyons, 221 F.3d at
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deferring to IRS, the courts determined that under ERISA and
applicable regulations, benefits paid at any other time or in
another form "must be worth at least as much as [the normal
retirement benefit] .79
A second common type of litigation related to cash balance
plans has been that some plaintiffs sued claiming that cash
balance plans discriminated against them based on their age. For
example, in Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, the plaintiffs
alleged that the IBM cash balance plan discriminated against
them under ERISA because "younger employees receive interest
credits for more years."8 0 The Seventh Circuit held that IBM's
cash balance plan was legal, stating that because the plan was
age-neutral, it was not age discriminatory8s According to Judge
Easterbrook, when Congress enacted ERISA's age discrimination
provisions, it did not "set out to legislate against the fact that
younger workers have (statistically) more time left before
retirement, and thus a greater opportunity to earn interest on
each year's retirement savings."8 2 Not all courts agreed with the
Seventh Circuit, however, and continued to hold that cash balance
8 3
plans were age discriminatory.
Fortunately, Congress has recently acted to removeprospectively, at least-the uncertainty regarding cash balance
and other hybrid pension plans. In 2006, Congress passed the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 ("PPA").84 It clarifies going forward
that a defined benefit plan is not considered age discriminatory "if
a participant's accrued benefit, as determined as of any date under
the terms of the plan, would be equal to or greater than that of any
similarly situated, younger individual who is or could be a
participant."85 Under the PPA, cash balance plans do not violate
the prohibition against ceasing or reducing the rate of an

1252.
79. See, e.g., West, 484 F.3d at 409 (quoting Esden, 229 F.3d. at 163).
80. 457 F.3d at 638.
81. Id. at 642.
82. Id. at 639.
83. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Pension Plan ERISA Litig., 470 F. Supp. 2d
323, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (following Cooper "would ignore the plain
language of the statute as well as the critical distinctions between the types of
plans outlined by the Second Circuit," and citing Esden, 229 F.3d at 158-63).
84. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780
(2006) [hereinafter PPA].
85. PPA § 701 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1054, I.R.C. § 411 and 29 U.S.C. §
623).); see also Jenner & Block Client Alert, Pension Protection Act of 2006
(2006), available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5C
relatedDocumentsPDFsl252%5C1376%5CPensionProtection Act Advisory-o
f_2006.pdf. "[A] participant is similarly situated to any other such individual
if such participant is identical to such other individual in every respect
(including period of service, compensation, position, date of hire, work history,
and any other respect) except for age." Id.
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employee's benefit accrual because of age8 6 if participants' accrued
benefits meet this similarly-situated standard.8 7 The PPA also
ends going forward any potential illegality with respect to the
whipsaw effect by amending the Internal Revenue Code (and
related provisions in ERISA and the ADEA) to state that cash
balance plans do not violate Section 417(e) and the general vesting
rules if the plan treats the accrued benefit's present value as the
participant's account balance.8 8 The cash balance plan qualifies
for this provision if the participant's benefit vests after no more
than three years of service.8 9
Hopefully, the PPA will eliminate the challenges faced by
employers who have adopted cash balance plans going forward.
Because they feature some of the qualities of defined contribution
plans, cash balance plans now will likely be strengthened as a
viable option for employers who are seeking to avoid many of the
problems they face with their existing defined benefit plans.
D. Stock Drop LitigationIn Recent Years
In recent years following fluctuations in the stock market,
numerous ERISA suits have been filed, typically as class actions,
in which plaintiffs allege that they were harmed due to a decline
in the value of their employers' stock. 90 In the typical stock-drop
scenario, beneficiary-plaintiffs who invested in their employer's
stock as an investment option provided as part of a defined
contribution plan file suit after the publicly-traded stock suffers a
significant drop in its price. 9 1 The plaintiffs allege that the plan's
fiduciaries imprudently invested in, continued to invest in, or
continued to offer as an investment option the employer's stock
and thereby violated their ERISA fiduciary duties and that the
plaintiffs were damaged by the decline in their account balances
92
under the plan.
Although the cases raising these issues have been numerous,
the legal outcomes of these ERISA "stock drop" cases are only now
becoming clearer as they work their way through the courts. For
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H) (2006); I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H) (2006).
87. PPA § 701(d) (amending ERISA § 204, I.R.C. § 411 and ADEA § 4);
Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 85.
88. Boren and Stein, supra note 71, §1.8 (citing I.R.C. § 411(a)(13)(A)).
89. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 411(a)(13)(B)).
90. See, e.g., In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1219
(D. Kan. 2004); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. ERISA Litig., No. 02 C 8324, 2004
WL 407007, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2004); In re WorldCom Inc., 263 F. Supp.
2d. 745, 764-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
91. See, e.g., Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1451 (6th Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs
brought suit where share price dropped 80 percent in roughly 18 months); In
re Duke Energy ERISA Litig., 281 F. Supp. 2d, 786, 790 (W.D.N.C. 2003)
(plaintiffs sued after price dropped 42 percent in a few months).
92. Edgar v. Avaya, 506 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2007).
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example, it is increasingly clear that courts will hold that a
"fiduciary who invest the assets in employer stock is entitled to a
presumption that it acted consistently with ERISA by virtue of
that decision." 93 Accordingly, courts have dismissed plaintiffs'
claims where plaintiffs' allegations fail to overcome the
presumption of prudence ERISA provides to the fiduciaries of an
94
employee stock ownership plan.
The stock drop litigation is another example of ERISA
litigation that grew out of the social, demographic, and financial
pressures that came before it. As employers faced the pressures
discussed in Part I that caused them to shift away from defined
benefit plans, funds were increasingly moved into defined
contribution plans. Defined contribution plans offered employees
the choice of investment options, and many participants thought
that investing in their employer's stock was a sound financial
decision. Also, some employers made their financial matches to
the participant's selection through the employer stock investment
option. The end result was that a substantial portion of some
plans became devoted to company stock. As the stock market
bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s burst, the stock decline
affected the balances of 401(k) participants. However, ERISA
allowed fiduciaries to invest funds in employer stock and
participants themselves often were the ones who selected the
employer stock as the investment option. These stock drop cases
reflect that many fiduciaries found themselves in a difficult
position because, due to the fact that substantial portions of the
participants' accounts were invested in employer stock, they were
vulnerable to large swings in the plan's value if the employer's
stock declined.

93. Id. at 347; e.g., Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995);
see also Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 701 (7th Cir. 2008); Edgar, 506

F.3d at 347; Steinman v. Hicks, 252 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758-59 (C.D. Ill. 2003)
(dismissing claim upon plaintiffs failure to overcome the presumption of
reasonableness), aff'd 352 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Duke Energy ERISA
Litig., 281 F. Supp. 2d at 794.
94. See, e.g., Edgar, 506 F.3d at 347-49 (holding the Moench presumption
applies equally to EIAPs as well as ESOPs); Pugh, 521 F.3d at 701 (holding
plaintiff must demonstrate the ERISA fiduciary unreasonably complied with
the plan's directions to invest solely in the employer's securities amidst a
circulation scandal); Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1459; Steinman, 252 F. Supp. 2d at
758-59 (dismissing claim upon plaintiffs failure to overcome the presumption
of reasonableness); In re Duke Energy ERISA Litig., 281 F. Supp. 2d at 794-95
(holding that plaintiffs claim failed to overcome the presumption of
reasonableness); see also In re Calpine Corp. ERISA Litig., 2005 WL 1431506,
at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005).
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III. NEW PRESSURES ARISING FROM THE IMPENDING RETIREMENT OF
BABY BOOMERS

It has been widely-recognized that the impending retirement
of Baby Boomers on a large scale will present new pressures on
employers. Just as employers had to adapt to accommodate the
large-scale entry of Baby Boomers into the workforce, they must
now react to their impending departure. In July 2005, there were
nearly eighty million Baby Boomers. 95 That was about twenty-five
percent of the population of the United States and nearly half of
all Americans ages eighteen to sixty-five. 96 In 2006, the first wave
of Baby Boomers, about 2.9 million people, turned sixty, and,
today, Baby Boomers range in age from forty-four to sixty-two. As
this group retires over the next twenty years, issues related to
their benefits and income they will receive from their investments
will become increasingly important.
An interesting demographic pressure that employers will now
face is the opposite issue they faced when Baby Boomers were
moving up in their ranks. As discussed in Part I, some employers
found that they had to make room for Baby Boomers in their
organizations by offering employees early retirement incentives to
exit early. Now, faced with the prospect that a large portion of
their work force may leave, many employers are seeking to avoid a
"brain drain."97 To encourage Baby Boomers to stay employed
while younger employees are brought up to speed, some employers
are offering older employees the chance to access their retirement
benefits while remaining with the company. 98 However, the
opportunities for employers to do so are limited by applicable tax
rules.
One of the financial pressures employers will now face with
the impending retirement of the Baby Boom generation is that
existing benefit obligations they have to employees and retirees,
also known as "legacy costs," threaten to place a major strain on
their financial and competitive positions. 99 Employers will likely
continue to investigate cost-efficient alternatives to traditional
defined benefit pensions.
Impending retirement of the Baby Boomers on a large scale
will pose a serious challenge to the government's ability to
sufficiently provide for the financial needs of these retirees. 100 For

95. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2007, supra note 21, at 12.

96. Id.
97. Claudia H. Deutsch, A Longer Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2008, at
Hi.
98. Id.; see also John Leland, Retirees Return to the Grind, But This Time
It's On Their Own Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at A-18.
99. See, e.g., Angela Boothe Noel, The Future of Cash Balance Plans:
Inherently Illegal or a Viable Pension Option?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 899, 900 (2005).
100. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE RETIREMENT PROSPECTS OF THE BABY
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example, because of the large number of expected retirees, existing
Social Security and Medicare programs may be unable to provide
benefits for retirees in the future. 10 1
Because of the strain that the Baby Boomers' retirement is
likely to place on the ability of the government to provide
assistance, the benefits retirees receive from their personal
retirement plans and accounts will take on even greater
importance. Moreover, the increased use of defined contribution
plans has placed the risk of lower returns on participants. As a
result, retirees will pay even greater attention to the value of their
accounts, the benefits they obtain, and how their funds are
managed. As Baby Boomers approach retirement, they are more
likely to scrutinize the performance of their investments,
especially if they are receiving reduced returns. To the extent that
returns do not match expectations, participants will likely be
looking for someone to take responsibility.
Finally, for years, fund assets have been building up as Baby
Boomers socked away money for retirement. Going forward, funds
will now need to consider that as Baby Boomers retire, there will
be a drawdown and removal of those assets and a resulting effect
on financial markets.
IV. THE FUTURE OF ERISA LITIGATION DUE TO THESE NEW
PRESSURES

As Baby Boomers begin to or will soon retire, new forms of
ERISA litigation are already developing. The direction of these
new avenues of litigation is not fully clear at this point. However,
as in the past, it is clear that the current social, demographic, and
financial pressures discussed in Part III at work today will
ultimately impact the development of ERISA case law in several
ways.

BOOMERS 1 (2004) (estimating that roughly twenty-five percent of baby
boomer households have not accumulated sufficient retirement savings and
that these households may need to rely on government assistance and benefit
programs); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, How MUCH
HAVE WORKERS SAVED FOR RETIREMENT? at 12 (Apr. 17, 2008) (reporting 49
percent of workers surveyed had saved less than $25,000 excluding homes and

defined benefit plans).
101. See THE RETIREMENT PROSPECTS OF THE BABY BOOMERS, supra note

100, at 1 ("[Tlhe population of retirees will grow much more quickly than the

taxpaying workforce, at a time when average benefits per retiree are expected
to continue rising. Those developments will place severe and mounting
budgetary pressures on the federal government.").
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A. The Supreme Court'sDecision in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &
Associates, Inc.
In 2008, in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that although ERISA does not
provide a remedy for individual injuries that are distinct from plan
injuries, it does authorize plaintiffs to recover for fiduciary
breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant's
individual account. 102
In LaRue, the plaintiff participated in a 401(k) plan, which is
a defined contribution plan that permitted him to direct the
investment of his account balance. The plaintiff alleged that the
plan administrator breached its fiduciary duty by failing to carry
out his investment instructions and that if his instruction had
been followed, he would not have incurred an alleged loss of
$150,000 in his plan account.10 3 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the
suit by holding that ERISA Section 502(a)(2) provides remedies
only for entire plans and does not allow for recovery of losses to
104
individual accounts.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, however, holding
that Section 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual
injuries that are distinct from plan injuries, but it does allow a
plaintiff to recover for "fiduciary breaches that impair the value of
plan assets in a participant's individual account." 10 5 The decision
recognized a difference between the defined contribution plan at
issue and defined benefit plans because an individual's fixed
retirement payment under a defined benefit plan is not affected by
misconduct unless it impacts the potential for default of the entire
plan. 10 6 For a defined contribution plan, however, "fiduciary
misconduct need not threaten the solvency of the entire plan to
reduce benefits below the amount participants would otherwise
receive." 107 Because the Court found that such misconduct falls
within the duties imposed on plan administrators by ERISA,108
under LaRue, a participant in a defined contribution pension plan
may sue a fiduciary whose alleged misconduct impaired the value
of "plan assets" in the participant's individual account under
Section 502(a)(2). 10 9

102. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1020, 1026 (2008).
103. Id. at 1022.
104. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs. Inc., 450 F.3d 570, 574 (4th Cir.
2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)).
105. LaRue, 128 S.Ct. at 1026.
106. Id. at 1025.

107. Id.
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006).
109. In a concurrence that Justice Kennedy joined, Chief Justice Roberts
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LaRue may ultimately raise several concerns for plan
administrators, and the potential effect of the Court's decision is
uncertain. At a minimum, however, it is likely to encourage
plaintiffs to try to sue under Section 502(a)(2) to recover for
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties due to a variety of alleged
administrative errors by the fiduciaries or those they appoint. In
addition, the decision could increase litigation exposure for plan
administrators, such as the plan sponsor, or plan recordkeepers,
who might be contractually liable for errors they commit.
B. Possible ERISA Litigation Due to Subprime Mortgages
One of the biggest financial, social, and political issues in
2007 and 2008 has been the fallout from defaults on subprime
mortgages and the ensuing turmoil in the global financial
markets. In essence, the issues began to arise when high-risk
borrowers, who had obtained "subprime" mortgages because of
their lower incomes or poorer credit histories, started to default on
those subprime loans. 110 Many of the mortgages had been bundled
together into investments called mortgage-backed securities
through which investors could obtain returns as the mortgages
were paid but also took on the risk that borrowers would
default.111 Financial-services firms and others who had invested
in the mortgage-backed securities began to face large losses
because the value of the underlying mortgage assets declined as
114
more and more borrowers went into default.
While the story of the subprime lending debacle is still being
written, it appears that it may prove to become the next form of
ERISA litigation. The subprime crisis has negatively affected a
number of pension funds. 115 Some pension funds have become the
agreed that the Fourth Circuit's analysis was flawed but he expressed concern
over the majority's conclusion that Section 502(a)(2) authorizes recovery in
such cases without analyzing whether such a claim is more appropriately
brought as a claim for benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B) and whether the
decision would allow plaintiffs to circumvent important procedural
components of Section 502(a)(1)(B), such as the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies and judicial deference to a fiduciary's use of
permitted discretion. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026-27. These also may prove to
be important issues for future courts that interpret the issues raised by
LaRue.
110. Robert Weisman, Questions that Plague Investors - and Wall Street,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2008, at C-1.
111. Id.
114. See, e.g., A Subprime Beat-down, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2008, at C1.
115. Craig C. Martin & William L. Scogland, The Subprime Crisis, 33 EMP.

REL. L. J. 105, 105 (Spring 2008). For example, the Ohio Public Employees
Retirement System has invested approximately $530 million, or about 1
percent of its total investments, in subprime mortgages and the California
Public Employees' Retirement System has invested close to $2.5 billion in
subprime mortgages out of $250 billion total invested. Id.
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lead plaintiffs in securities actions against subprime lenders they
invested in and have alleged that the lenders made false and
116
misleading statements that inflated the value of their stock.
Lawsuits in which plan participants sue pension funds or pension
fund managers as defendants alleging that they made a poor
investment decision by investing in mortgage-backed securities
117
have not begun in earnest-yet.
However, an action filed in October 2007 suggests a possible
wave of new ERISA litigation. In Unisystems Inc. Employees
Profit Sharing Plan v. State Street Bank, et al., the plaintiff filed a
class action complaint in the Southern District of New York
asserting breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. 11s Plaintiffs
alleged that "State Street breached its fiduciary duties under
ERISA ...by causing State Street's purportedly conservative bond
funds .. .to invest in high-risk and highly leveraged financial
instruments tied to, among other things, mortgage backed
securities."' 1 9 The complaint further alleges that the "recent
collapse of the subprime mortgage industry exposed the aggressive
gamble State Street took with the retirement assets invested by
ERISA plans .
",120
The plaintiff claims its losses are in the
hundreds of millions of dollars. 121 It may be only a matter of time
before additional similar ERISA suits are filed.
The exact path that ERISA litigation related to the subprime
116. See, e.g., Gold v. New Century Fin. Corp., 07-cv-00931 (C.D. Cal.,
consolidated complaint filed Sept. 14, 2007) (reflecting New York State
Teachers' Retirement System as lead plaintiff); Atlas v. Accredited Home
Lenders Holding Co., 3:07-cv-00488, 2008 WL 80949, at *1 (S.D. Cal., Jan. 4,
2008) (reflecting Arkansas Teacher Retirement System as lead plaintiff).
117. There have been several stock-drop suits filed in which plaintiffs
alleged that it was imprudent for the company to have continued to offer the
employer's stock as an investment option in light of the company's
investments in the subprime market. See, e.g., Alvidres v. Countrywide Fin.
Corp., No. CV 07-5810-RGK (CTx), 2008 WL 1700312, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9,
2008); In re Washington Mut., Inc., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 536 F.
Supp. 2d 1377, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2008); Pisano v. Bear Stearns Cos., 08-3006
(S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Mar. 28, 2008).
118. Unisystems Inc. Employees Profit Sharing Plan v. State Street Bank &
Trust Co., No. 07 CIV 9319, 2007 WL 4189444 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007); ); see
also In re State Street Bank & Trust Co. ERISA Litig., --- F. Supp. 2d .--- , No.

07 CIV. 8499 (RJH), 2008 WL 4414662, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 30, 2008)
(reporting that complaint in related action alleged that plans 'lost roughly $80
million in the summer of 2007 due to State Street's overly risky investment
strategies, including 'undisclosed, highly leveraged positions in mortgagebased financial derivatives"').
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id. at *4.
121. Id. at *5.The cases against State Street are still on-going. In a recent
decision in one of the related actions State Street, however, the court
dismissed plaintiffs claims for monetary relief in the form of "restitution and
disgorgement" the extent those claims were brought pursuant under Section
502(a)(3) of ERISA, finding that the claims were legal, not equitable. Id. at *6.
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mess will follow remains to be seen. Based on the claims asserted
against State Street, however, it appears that this new area of
litigation may focus on traditional questions related to fiduciary
duties that other pension fund and ERISA litigation have already
That said, these cases will continue to present
addressed.
challenges to fiduciaries and could expose them to significant and
costly litigation based on their investment decisions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Like other forms of litigation, litigation under ERISA is a
natural result of the events and trends in the world outside the
In the past, social, demographic, and financial
courtroom.
pressures transformed the employee benefits area in numerous
ways, perhaps most importantly by leading to the shift from
defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. These trends
resulted in several kinds of litigation that plan participants and
legal practitioners continue to face.
The new challenges that the retirement of Baby Boomers
presents to employers and participants have already given rise to
new forms of litigation. The precise path of this new litigation is
not entirely clear. However, because these new and eventual
retirees are likely to closely scrutinize their benefits and the
conduct of those who manage their investments, it is very likely
that these new forms of litigation put pressure on fiduciaries to
closely monitor how they operate, what investments they select,
and how they communicate with participants.

